Title 1: The artist or the historian: who helps us appreciate human experience more?
Areas of knowledge: The arts and history (both fixed)
Do we gain a better appreciation of the human experience from the artist or the historian? Discuss with reference to the arts and history.
The question: Compare two ways of knowing the past and present: to appreciate human experience more fully, should we turn to the artist or to the historian?
How to argue it: Start by defining a better appreciation: emotional understanding, or accurate knowledge backed by evidence? Historians use sources and method to aim for reliability but struggle to convey lived experience; artists can make readers feel it, sometimes at the cost of accuracy. You can conclude that each is better in a different sense, as long as you state the standard you are judging by.
Examples to consider: Picasso's Guernica beside historical studies of the bombing; Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front beside First World War historiography; oral history projects.
Common mistake: Saying both are valuable without answering the comparison the title asks for.
Title 2: Can changing values still guide the pursuit of knowledge?
Areas of knowledge: Two areas of knowledge of your choice
If values change over time, how can they, nevertheless, continue to guide the pursuit of knowledge? Discuss with reference to two areas of knowledge.
The question: If values shift over time, how can they still serve as a guide in the pursuit of knowledge?
How to argue it: Work with the tension between change and guidance. One line: changes in values can themselves be progress, as new knowledge corrects old values, so change does not mean unreliability. Another: some underlying values, such as honesty and replicability, stay fairly stable and do the guiding.
Examples to consider: Human sciences: research ethics review after Milgram's obedience studies; natural sciences: the 3Rs in animal research; history: which groups get written about as social values change.
Common mistake: Listing changes in values without explaining how they guide the production of knowledge.
Title 3: How reliable is knowledge that rests on assumptions?
Areas of knowledge: The human sciences and one other
In the production of knowledge, how can knowledge be reliable if it is built on assumptions? Discuss with reference to the human sciences and one other area of knowledge.
The question: To what extent can knowledge be reliable when it depends on assumptions that are not themselves proven?
How to argue it: Separate assumptions that are acknowledged and tested from hidden ones. The first kind makes knowledge testable and correctable, and can support reliability; the second kind is the real risk. You can also ask whether any knowledge is free of assumptions.
Examples to consider: The rational-agent assumption in economics and the challenge from behavioural economics; WEIRD samples in psychology; Euclid's parallel postulate and non-Euclidean geometry in mathematics.
Common mistake: Treating any assumption as a weakness without considering what assumptions make possible.
Title 4: Is every coincidence worth noticing?
Areas of knowledge: Mathematics and one other
To what extent do you agree with the claim that “any coincidence is worth noticing; you can throw it away later if it is only a coincidence” (Agatha Christie). Answer with reference to mathematics and one other area of knowledge.
The question: Quoting Agatha Christie, the title asks whether every apparent coincidence deserves attention, since it can be set aside later if it proves meaningless.
How to argue it: On one side, noticing coincidences drives discovery: a pattern is spotted first and proved or tested later. On the other, attention has a cost, people see patterns in randomness, and confirmation bias makes it hard to let go. The key question is who decides when to discard a coincidence, and by what standard.
Examples to consider: Mathematics: Ramanujan's intuited formulas; patterns that hold for many cases and then fail, such as the Borwein integrals; natural sciences: Fleming and penicillin; the birthday problem showing coincidences are common.
Common mistake: Only telling success stories and ignoring the many noticed coincidences that led nowhere.
Title 5: Should simpler explanations be preferred?
Areas of knowledge: Two areas of knowledge of your choice
In the production of knowledge, when choosing one explanation over another, to what extent should simplicity be prioritized? Discuss with reference to two areas of knowledge.
The question: When choosing between competing explanations, how far should we prefer the simpler one?
How to argue it: Define simplicity first: fewer assumptions, or easier to understand? Occam's razor often works in the natural sciences, but simplicity is one criterion among several and has to work alongside evidence. In history and the human sciences, single-cause explanations often oversimplify.
Examples to consider: Copernicus versus Ptolemy's epicycles; quantum mechanics, which is far from simple yet fits the evidence best; single-cause versus multi-cause accounts of the First World War.
Common mistake: Treating Occam's razor as a rule rather than discussing when it fails.
Title 6: What do paradoxical or counterintuitive ideas add to knowledge?
Areas of knowledge: The natural sciences and one other
In the pursuit of knowledge, what value is there in exploring the paradoxical or the counterintuitive? Discuss with reference to the natural sciences and one other area of knowledge.
The question: What is gained by investigating paradoxical or counterintuitive ideas in the pursuit of knowledge?
How to argue it: Paradoxes expose the limits of current theories and intuitions and often drive paradigm shifts. Weigh the costs too: not every counterintuitive idea is right, so when should intuition win and more evidence be demanded?
Examples to consider: Natural sciences: wave–particle duality and the twin paradox in relativity; mathematics: Zeno's paradoxes and limits, the Monty Hall problem; the arts: Escher's impossible figures.
Common mistake: Listing interesting paradoxes without explaining what knowledge they produced.